Private Participation in Department of Justice
Antitrust Proceedings
The great bulk of federal civil antitrust suits are terminated by consent decrees.1 A consent decree is framed as an injunctive order but
lacks specific findings of fact or an admission of guilt. Once a decree
gains judicial approval, however, it binds the parties to the same extent as would a fully litigated judgment. 2 Consent decrees are most
commonly the product of confidential negotiations between the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the defendants. 3 Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,4 while authorizing such settlements,
specifically provides that they shall constitute prima facie evidence
that the defendant violated the antitrust laws unless entered "before
any testimony has been taken." 5 A desire to avoid this prima facie effect
1 See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAw & EcoN. 365, 375
(1970). Of the 323 civil antitrust judgments in favor of the Government during the period
from 1950 to 1969, 265 or eighty-two percent were entered by consent.
An extensive antitrust program is also carried on under the auspices of the Federal
Trade Commission. Posner, supra at 368-71, 404, 406, 408. The enforcement procedures of
the Commission will not be examined here, however.
2 For a thorough discussion of these and other features of consent decrees, see Flynn,
Consent Decrees in Antitrust Enforcement: Some Thoughts and Proposals,53 IowA L. Rxv.
983, 988-1003 (1968). See also M. GOLDBERG, THE CONSENT DECREE: ITS FORMULATION AND
UsE (Michigan State Bureau of Business & Economic Research Occasional Paper No. 8,
1962).

3 The literature describing the nature of consent decree negotiations is copious. EspeSUBcoMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH

daily illuminating are ANTrrRuSr

CONG., IsT SESS., REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

10-13 (1959) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]; Harsha, Some Observations on the
Negotiation of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 9 ANuTTR. BULL. 691 (1964); Jinkinson, Negotiation of Consent Decrees, 9 ANTrr. Bu . 673 (1964); Zimmerman, Procedures for Settling
with the Antitrust Division, 37 ANTrrR. L.J. 212 (1968).
4 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). The statute provides:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any dvil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to
the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima fade evidence against
such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such
defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15a of this title, as
to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided,That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or
decrees entered in actions under section 15a of this title.
5 Id.
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in subsequent private treble damage actions 6 provides antitrust defendants with a major inducement to settle.7 A settlement also allows
savings of considerable time and resources required in a full trial on
the merits.8
Section 5(a) has had a substantial impact on the role played by courts
in reviewing the adequacy of decrees. 9 Although vested with the power
to disapprove those decrees not consonant with the public interest, 0 the
courts have exercised this prerogative only rarely." Their reticence primarily reflects the courts' deferral to the congressional policy determination that the consent decree option is a useful adjunct to effective
antitrust law enforcement. To preserve the full benefits of this alternative, the court must avoid taking testimony concerning the defendant's
alleged antitrust violations. This makes it difficult for the court to form
any independent judgment concerning the adequacy or propriety of the
decree. Unable to conduct an independent evaluation of the merits of
a particular settlement, the court must rely on the Antitrust Division's
12
opinion that the decree is consistent with the public interest.
6 Private actions are authorized under the provisions of sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1970).
7 Flynn, supra note 2, at 1003; Comment, Consent Decrees and the Private Action: An
Antitrust Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. Rxv. 627, 628 (1965). See generally Symposium-Relationship Between Government Enforcement Actions and Private Damage Actions, 37 ANTrrR.
L.J. 823, 828, 839 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
8 See Posner, supra note 1, at 374-78. The difference in time between the resolution of
fully litigated contests and those settled by consent decrees is considerable. Between 1951
and 1957, for example, the average litigated case took more than fifty-nine months to try,
while those settled by consent decree averaged only thirty-two months. House REPoRT,
supra note 3, at 8-10.
) See Handler, The Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits
-The Twenty-third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUmN. L. R v. 1, 17-23 (1971); Comment, Consent Decrees and the Judicial Function, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 312 (1970).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970); United
States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
11 There is some indication that courts are now making more searching and critical inquiries into the provisions of the consent decrees presented to them. One decree was
summarily rejected by the court in United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp.
432, 434 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968), while another court refused to enter a decree until the parties
could demonstrate to its satisfaction that certain provisions accurately reflected congressional intent in the enactment of the antitrust laws. Compare United States v. Ling-TemcoVought, Inc., 1970 Trade Cas. 88,559 (W.D. Pa. 1970), with United States v. Ling-TemcoVought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
12 One authority has been reluctant to credit the typical judge even with making a
good faith effort to grasp the merits of the issues raised by the consent decree before him:
At best, judicial implementation of consent decrees in most cases can only be
analogized to the performance of a symbolic religious rite by a high priest, or, at
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The extensive use of consent decrees has been objected to by nonparties to the litigation for a variety of reasons. Some have felt aggrieved by the loss of prima facie evidence entailed by the Antitrust
Division's decision to settle rather than to prosecute the suit to judgment.

3

Others have objected to particular substantive provisions of the

agreement which they have felt do not adequately insulate them from
recurrences of the defendant's alleged past misconduct.' 4 These dissatisfied parties have often attempted to press their claims by seeking
to intervene in the decree ratification proceedings. 5
worst, as the performance of an important public function with the machine-like
logic of a chiclet dispenser.
Thus, a consent decree in an antitrust case ... [is] submitted to and adopted by a
proper judicial tribunal without explanation or understanding of the circumstances
and consequences of the agreement ....
Flynn, supra note 2, at 989-90. On the basis of the cases examined in this comment, this
appraisal seems unduly harsh. Typically, judges have made considerable efforts to acquaint
themselves with the issues raised by the decree, and they have often exhibited a markedly
independent point of view from that put forward by the litigants. See cases cited note 11
supra.
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly correct that courts are generally deferential to the
Antitrust Division's position on controversial issues. As one court frankly acknowledged:
Of course, there should be no pretense that a district judge, confronted with situations like this one, is able to reach detailed judgments on the merits. The court in
such a situation--short of compelling the trial a consent decree avoids--must proceed
in some degree upon faith in the competence and integrity of government counsel.
Those supporting the decree as well as those opposed to it join in solemn assurances
that the court is not viewed as a "rubber stamp" when presented with an elaborate
consent decree in a complex case like this one. This leaves the reality, already acknowledged, that the court's time, talents and resources for intensive scrutiny are severely
limited.
United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (footnote omitted). The
issues raised by the court's dilemma in such situations are fully aired in Handler, supra
note 9, at 18-23; Comment, supra note 9, at 316, 320-23.
1s This type of concern motivated attempts to intervene in United States v. National
Bank & Trust Co., 319 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Automobile Mfrs.
Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v.
United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970); United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432
(C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389
U.S. 580 (1968); United States v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., No. 67 C 612 (N.D. Ill.,
Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 390 U.S. 715
(1968). In each case the court denied the petition to intervene.
14 Typical cases include United States v. Simmonds Precision Prods., Inc., 319 F. Supp.
620 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 41 F.R.D 342 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd per euriam sub
nom. Lupton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 388 U.S. 457 (1967).
15 Although secret consent decree negotiations do not provide a direct means for representing these points of view, objections to this procedure have been at least partly met
by the adoption of a regulation by the Department of Justice providing for a thirty-day
waiting period between the filing of a decree with the court and the date of entry. During
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Such attempts have rarely led courts to grant a formal role in the
proceedings to the potential intervenors."0 This situation exists despite
a growing willingness by the courts to expand the degree and type of
17
interest sufficient to support intervention in other areas of the law
that time concerned parties may file comments on the decree with the Antitrust Division.
The Division customarily reserves the right to withdraw the decree during this waiting
period should it find any merit in these objections. The regulation provides:
(a) It is hereby established as the policy of the Department of Justice to consent to
a proposed judgment in an action to prevent or restrain violations of the antitrust
laws only after or on condition that an opportunity is afforded persons (natural or
corporate) who may be affected by such judgment and who are not named as parties
to the action to state comments, views or relevant allegations prior to the entry of
such proposed judgment by the court.
(b) Pursuant to this policy, each proposed consent judgment shall be filed in court
or otherwise made available upon request to interested persons as early as feasible but
at least 80 days prior to entry by the court. Prior to entry of the judgment, or some
earlier specified date, the Department of Justice will receive and consider any written
comments, views or relevant allegations relating to the proposed judgment, which
the Department may, in its discretion, disclose to the other parties to the action. The
Department of Justice shall reserve the right (1) to withdraw or withhold its consent
to the proposed judgment if the comments, views or allegations submitted disclose
facts or considerations which indicate that the proposed judgment is inappropriate,
improper or inadequate and (2) to object to intervention by any party not named as
a party by the Government.
(c) The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division may establish
procedures for implementing this policy. The Attorney General may permit an exception to this policy in a specific case where extraordinary circumstances require
some shorter period than 30 days or some other procedure than that stated herein,
and where it is clear that the public interest in the policy hereby established is not
compromised.
28 C.F.R. § 50.1 (1971). Prior to the adoption of this regulation in 1961, with but a solitary
exception consent decrees presented to the court were apparently adopted as a matter of
course. Handler, supra note 9, at 17. Since that time, however, there appear to have been
a steadily increasing number of cases in which either the Antitrust Division or the court
has altered the provisions of consent decrees in response to nonparty objections. See United
States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (provision added to
consent decree providing additional security for employee and pension benefit funds of
acquired corporation); United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal.
1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 889 U.S.
580 (1968) (one proposed decree withdrawn unilaterally by Government after receiving
objections from nonconsenting defendants and amid curiae, another withdrawn after court
refused to ratify agreement). See also United States v. National Bank & Trust Co., 319 F.
Supp. 930 (E.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D.
Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970);
United States v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., No. 67 C 612 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 27, 1967),
aff'd per curiam sup nom. City of New York v. United States, 390 US. 715 (1968). In each
of these cases impounding orders were entered in order to preserve information assembled
by the Government for possible utilization in the future by treble damage claimants.
16 See cases cited notes 13-14 supra. See also Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States,
866 US. 683 (1961). But see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386
U.S. 129 (1967); United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 280 F. Supp. 260, 263
(E.D. Ky. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 391
U.S. 469 (1968).
17 See; e.g., Hatton: v. County Bd: of Educ., 422 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.' 1970); Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
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and the need of the courts for a full airing of the issues if they are to
18
protect the public interest.
Section I of this comment will examine the reasons for denying formal party status to potential intervenors. It will suggest that they do
not present insurmountable barriers to limited, conditioned formal
participation. Section II will develop the thesis that this near-uniform
rejection of nonparty claims in fact conceals a sophisticated judicial experiment in limited but informal intervention. 9 Through this technique the courts have accommodated the pressures against developing
prima facie evidence while allowing nonparties to air their grievances
and to benefit from a series of flexible remedies fashioned to meet
their concerns. Section III will conclude with a comparison of a flexible
system of formal intervention with the present informal system. It
will be suggested that while a formal system can be constructed within
the framework of existing law governing intervention, this would probably not result in any increase in the procedural rights of nonparties
over those available under the informal method presently employed.
However, the adoption of a formal alternative might prove to be beneficial to potential intervenors by serving to legitimize their participation in the formulation of the eventual settlement.
I.

OBJECTIONS TO FORMAL INTERVENTIONS: .AN OVERVIEW

In the federal antitrust context, courts have usually denied intervention to interested nonparties. 20 The justifications for denial fall
Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967); cf. Norman's on the
Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 73,606 (3d Cir. June

17, 1971).
18 See generally Handler, supra note 9, at 18-23; Comment, supra note 9.
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 24 governs intervention in federal civil litigation. The rule provides
in relevant part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: . . . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to
intervene in an action: . . . (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common. . . . In exercising its discretion
the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
20 See cases cited notes 13, 15 supra; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 5
73,526 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1971); United States v.
TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.)
General Tire & Rubber Co., 1970 Trade Cas. 89,462 (N.D. Ohio 1970); United States v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 50 F.R.D. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) But see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S 129 (1967); United States v Simmonds Precision Prods.,
Inc., 319 F. Supp. 620. (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. First National Bank.&. Trust Co.,
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into four broad categories: (1) those based on the Antitrust Division's assumed exclusive representation of the public interest in such
actions, (2) those arising from the Division's right to determine the
allocation of its own resources, (3) those founded on the right of the
litigants to resolve their differences free from "undue delay or prejudice," and (4) those rooted in the desire to preserve a viable settlement
option for the litigants. Careful analysis of these considerations reveals
that they apply convincingly only to an unconditioned, all-or-nothing
approach to intervention and carry far less weight when directed to
carefully controlled, limited participation.
The Antitrust Division and the Public Interest
Courts frequently credit the Antitrust Division with pursuing a
broad public purpose in its antitrust activities which, it is argued,
would be impeded by the introduction of the numerous private grievances growing out of the defendant's alleged activities. 21 The exclusivity position is based in part on the statute which entrusts the Attorney General with the conduct of antitrust litigation.22 Any intrusion
A.

280 F. Supp. 260 (E.D Ky 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Central Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States, 391 U.S. 469 (1968).
Cascade in particular seemed to auger an increased private participation in federal
antitrust proceedings. There the Supreme Court held that objectors to a divestiture order
entered below pursuant to its earlier mandate should have been allowed to intervene as of
right in the proceedings before the district court. This decision, however, has only limited
applicability to the consent decree context. In Cascade there was a prior mandate against
which to measure the adequacy of the decree. Further, since the illegality of the defendant's
conduct had already been determined, the intervenors were not depriving the defendant
of an opportunity to obtain a settlement not probative of its guilt. Finally, the only
method by which the Supreme Court could revise the terms of this settlement was by
first holding that intervention had been appropriate.
None of these conditions are present in the typical consent decree situation. First, the
proper standard of relief has not been previously determined by a trial on the merits.
Second, any probing of the merits of a controversy by taking testimony limits the opportunity for settlement because it would give the decree evidentiary weight in subsequent
private actions. Finally, should the court be persuaded that the applicant's complaint has
merit, it need not grant intervention to protect this interest, but instead may merely refuse
to approve the decree until the particular deficiency is corrected.
21 See, e.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 693 (1961); United
States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518-19 (1954). See also Letter from Asst. Att'y Gen.
Donald F. Turner to Rep. Emanuel Celler, in BNA Antitr. & Trade Reg. Rep., Mar. 21,
1967, at X-1, X-3 [hereinafter cited as Turner Letter].
22 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964) provides in relevant part:
under the direction
[iMt shall be the duty of the several United States attorneys ....
of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain
such [antitrust] violations.
This statute has even been used to buttress a denial of intervention designed to secure
enforcement of a decree already entered. United States v. Western Electric Co., 1968 Trade
Cas. 85,280-81 (D.NJ. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Clark Walter & Sons v. United
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by nonparties is viewed as fettering the Attorney General's discretion.
Private interests, it is asserted, are provided an adequate forum for
23
their grievances in private actions.
These arguments assume that protection of private interests is generally unrelated to protection of the public good or that a court granting intervention would not be able to restrict private party
participation to those issues which are related to the public good. Such
pessimism is not warranted either by rule 24 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or by developing antitrust case law. Any negotiated
consent decree raises only a limited number of issues which the Antitrust Division has already determined to be harmful to the public
interest. Rule 24(a) insures that once a party is admitted to the proceedings, inquiry beyond the scope of those issues can be barred unless the
intervenor can show that his interest is of public concern and inade24
quately protected by the decree.
Further, an examination of the cases in which intervention has been
sought reveals that those instances in which the applicant advances a
considerable number of private interests in opposition to the decree are
relatively rare.25 In United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.26
(L-T-V), for example, employees and pensioners of the illegally acquired company voiced the fear that their benefit trust funds were
inadequately secured against predatory raids by the acquiring conglomerate. The district court shared their concern and fashioned a
States, 392 U.S. 657 (1968). But this argument seems to prove too much, since the Attorney
General's control of the litigation is already conditioned by considerations of public
policy, and whether a particular intervenor is raising a meritorious objection to a decree
cannot be decided without letting him present his case. Cf. New Jersey Communications
Corp. v. AT&T, 1968 Trade Cas. 85,445, 85,447 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
23 See, e.g., Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 141
(1944). See also authorities cited note 21 supra.
24 A similar protection against an excessive number of parties intervening under rule
24(b) is provided by the requirement that interventions under that provision shall not
cause "undue delay or prejudice" to the adjudication of the rights of existing litigants.
But see Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967), on remand, 291 F. Supp. 3, 33 (D. Utah 1968) (twenty-six parties allowed to intervene), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S.

464 (1969).
25 Typical cases in which the intervenor's objections were narrowly defined include
United States v. Simmonds Precision Prods., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (challenging only provision of decree allowing piecemeal divestiture); United States v. LingTemco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (seeking additional protection for
employee and pensioner trust funds); United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (opposing merger because of possible impairment of contracts with one of merging
firms).
26

315 F. Supp. 1301 (X.D. Pa. 1970).
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protective order designed to insure that these trusts would not be di27
verted from their intended purposes pending divestiture.
Two points about this case are noteworthy. First, the court had no
difficulty in deciding that the employees' and pensioners' concern over
possible misuses of their trust funds was "an element of public concern"
which merited "judicial protection as long as jurisdiction remains
here." 28 Thus, it is apparent that the protection of at least some private
interests remains an important element of the broader public interests, which are sometimes inadvertently overlooked by the Antitrust
Division. This demonstrates that nonparties have a valuable informational function to play in the consent decree process, a fact recognized both by the Division itself 29 and by courts.8 0
The second significant feature of the L-T-V case is that accommodation of the objecting parties did not require the court to elevate the objectors to the formal status of parties on a par with the Attorney
General. The protective order was fashioned by the court without
formally admitting representatives of the employees and.pensioners to
the proceedings. 3' It is difficult, however, to see how the claim to exclusive representation was furthered by preventing these groups from
acquiring the status of parties. The court's inquiry does not appear to
have been circumscribed by their exclusion, 82 nor does it appear that
granting leave to intervene would have altered the course of the proceedings. Though relegated to an informal status, the employees and
pensioners were able to present their grievances fully and to receive
appropriate relief; and there is no reason to suppose that any additional procedural rights of formal party status would have been
exercised had intervention been granted. Thus, the Attorney General's
control of the litigation would have been compromised to an equal
27 Id. at 1309-10. The court's order appears at 1970 Trade Cas. 88,871 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
28 315 F. Supp. at 1310.

29 Turner Letter, supra note 21, at X-2.
80 See, e.g., United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United
States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 618-19 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam

sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970) (by implication); United
States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432, 434 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per curiam
sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co., v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
- 81 The benefited parties had made their concerns known to the presiding judge by
letter, whereafter he had acted on his own motion to secure the funds in question. 315 F.
Supp. at 1309-10.
32 While recognizing the right of the parties to terminate their dispute by a mutually
agreeable settlement, the trial judge stated that he was "nevertheless not relieved from
examining . . . and inquiring into any matter which in equity should have been considered had the matter proceeded in adversary fashion." Id. at 1309 (emphasis added). It
is-hard to conceive of a broader scope of investigation than this.
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extent in either case. Such a compromise is an inevitable consequence
of the court's realization that the exclusivity claim cannot always be
maintaineds 3
B.

The Antitrust Division's Right to Control Its Resources

A second group of reasons often given for denying intervention
stems from the Antitrust Division's need to employ its own scarce
resources in what it considers to be the optimally effective fashion. It
is argued that this goal cannot be achieved unless the Division is free
to negotiate settlements whenever it feels that such a course would
promote a more efficient and effective antitrust enforcement program 4
and that the presence of additional parties would narrow the Government's litigation options to dismissal or full trial.85
This line of reasoning turns on the twofold assumption that antitrust
enforcement primarily through consent decrees is optimally productive
33 The exclusivity position was also undermined by the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967). There, pursuant to an earlier Supreme Court mandate, the Antitrust Division had negotiated a
divestiture order with the defendant El Paso which the majority of the Court viewed as
threatening "to perpetuate rather than terminate this unlawful merger." Id. at 141. Advocates of a more stringent decree had been refused intervention below, and the Supreme
Court held that denial to be error. The objections these parties had raised were "part of
the public interest in a competitive system" and lay "at the heart of our mandate." Id.
at 135. The Division, the Court found, had "knuckled under" to El Paso and had "fallen
far short of representing... [the intervenors] interests." Id. at 136-41. The Court ordered
de novo proceedings to fashion a new decree and granted these applicants full party status.
Cascade is an extraordinary case, especially when one considers that the Supreme Court
in effect accused the Department of Justice of negotiating a settlement which violated the
Court's earlier mandate. While such a flagrant abuse is unlikely in the consent decree
context, Cascade suggests that where the Antitrust Division has arguably misconceived
some element of public concern, a court would be justified in granting some form of
participation to a nonparty in order to secure a more balanced appraisal of that issue.
34 Turner Letter, supra note 21, at X-2 to X-3; Symposium, supra note 7, at 860-61.
35 See Defendants' Joint Response to Applications for Leave to Intervene at 8, 16
[hereinafter cited as Defendants' Brief] and Response of the Plaintiff to Applications for
Intervention at 16-18 [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Brief], filed in connection with
applications to intervene in United States v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., No. 67 C 612
(N.D. Ill.,
Nov. 27, 1967) aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States,
390 U.S. 715 (1968). In Turner Letter, supra note 21, the problem was phrased in this
manner:
[T]he very process of formal intervention, if that is held to carry with it the full
rights of the usual litigant to present evidence and to appeal, would threaten to
eliminate one of the major motivating factors that leads both the Government and
the defendants to attempt to work out an appropriate decree, since intervention
would force on the Government and defendants at least some of the burdens of litigation that both, for diverse reasons, have sought to avoid.
Id. at X-3 (emphasis added). The qualifications in Mr. Turner's thoughtful statement
point out that the thrust of the Division's objections to intervention would be blunted if
the procedural rights given intervenors could be carefully controlled.
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and that an intervenor would automatically acquire the right to block
any settlement not acceptable to it and thus occasion an undue expenditure of governmental resources. A judicial challenge to the first assumption would be tantamount to usurpation of legislative and
executive policy-making functions. Consequently, there is a strong
rationale for courts not to interfere in this area. 6 The second assumption is, however, much easier to challenge. It is difficult to see how
any objections that an intervenor might have to a particular consent
decree could prevent the court from entering the decree as an independent agreement binding solely on the signatories-the Government
87
and the defendants.
In one case in which this situation seems to have arisen, United
States v. Simmonds Precision Products, Inc.,3 s the issue was decided
against the intervenor. There intervention in a divestiture proceeding
was granted as of right under rule 24(a)(2) for the stated purpose of
"opposing the entry of a final judgment on consent ... -"9After oral
argument and an evidentiary hearing, the court overruled all of the
intervenor's objections and entered the decree as originally submitted
by the Government and the defendant. 40 If the intervenor had the right
to block the judgment by withholding his consent to the decree, he
chose not to exercise it, a highly improbable result considering the
court's adverse ruling on the merits. A more likely explanation is
simply that formal participation as a party to the proceedings does not
give the intervenor discretionary authority to block the decree. The
consent of the intervenor is irrelevant.
Simmonds suggests, therefore, that the critical issue is not whether
a potential intervenor should be made a formal party, but rather what
degree of participation should be accorded to such an applicant.
36 This position is not based on a claim that an antitrust defendant has a right to
settle his dispute with the Antitrust Division. Compare United States v. Brunswick-BalkeCollender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962), with United States v. Ward Baking Co.,
1963 Trade Cas. 77,449 (M.D. Fla. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 327 (1964). That assertion has apparently been discredited. See Comment, supra note 9, at 318-20. Nor does its validity
depend on a claim that preservation of the settlement option is the paramount rationale
underlying section 5(a). That position too would be of doubtful accuracy. See Note, Closing an Antitrust Loophole: CollateralEffect for Nolo Pleas and Government Settlements,
55 VA. L. REv. 1334, 1336-37 n.8, 1338-39 & nn.16-18 (1969). Rather, it relies only on the
limited assertion that the settlement feature of section 5(a) has as one of its bases a desire
to ease the Antitrust Division's enforcement burden, even at some cost to individual private
plaintiffs. Of this there can be little doubt. See Note, supra at 1338-39 nn.16-18.
37 This of course assumes that the intervenor's objections have not been found to be
meritorious by the court.
38 319 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 621-23.
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The Litigants' Right to an Expeditious Resolution of the Controversy

A customary reason for denying intervention in antitrust cases is that
participation by intervenors would "unduly delay or prejudice" the
resolution of the controversy between the litigants. 41 Such pronouncements should be taken lightly, however, since a close reading of the
cases in which these statements appear reveals that the applicant for
intervention has usually been heard extensively as an amicus. 42 Thus,
delay and prejudice attributable to additional litigation is not appreciably shortened by the denial of intervention. The arguments of a
party and of an amicus consume equal time. Moreover, the denial of
intervention is typically coupled with a decision on the merits of the
intervenor's claim and, where the court has upheld the claim, the
granting of some measure of relief. 43 In United States v. Blue Chip
Stamp Co., 4 4 for example, the court denied intervention, remarking

that the potential intervenors had "fail[ed] to raise any additional arguments not already heard at length and denied by this court" and characterizing their objections to the decree as "so shallow as to be devoid of
merit. '45 Yet even such a blanket rejection required the expenditure
of the court's time for adequate evaluation. In fact, the court's involvement in negotiations had stretched over eleven months and had resulted
in the rejection of two earlier decrees. During this period the applicants
for intervention had been heard extensively as amici.
The import of such cases as Blue Chip is that a fair amount of "delay
and prejudice" will be tolerated by the court before it is found to be
"undue." Consequently, the party or nonparty status of the potential
41 Such characterizations are typically made with the intention of disqualifying the
intervenor from permissive intervention under rule 24(b). See, e.g., United States v. CIBA
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F.
Supp. 617, 619-20 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United
States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
42 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 5 TRADE R G. REp. (1971 Trade
Cas.)
73,526 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1971); United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal.
1969), aff'd per curiam sub noma.City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970)
43 See, e.g., United States v. National Bank & Trust Co., 319 F. Supp. 930 (ED. Pa.
1970); United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970);
United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam
sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970); United States v. Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc., No. 67 C 612 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 715 (1968).
44 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
45 272 F. Supp. at 440-41.
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intervenor is not the determinative factor. Rather, it is the ability of
the court to condition party status appropriately in order to make it
conducive to prompt but effective inquiry into the underlying controversy.
D.

The Desire to Preserve a Viable Settlement Option

Central to the courts' concern with permitting nonparties to intervene in consent decree proceedings is a desire to maintain the viability
of the settlement option. Intervenors could pose two distinct threats to
this process. First, they might request the right to be represented at
bargaining sessions between the Antitrust Division and the defendant.
Second, they might seek to institute discovery procedures to gain access
to the Division's evidence of the defendant's antitrust violations.
Were the intervenor to succeed in either of these requests, the utility
of the settlement for the defendant would be greatly diminished. Consent decree negotiations involve many sensitive matters which defendants do not want revealed to outside parties. A defendant who
believed that such information would be disclosed to third parties
would not readily enter into discussions with the Antitrust Division.
Even more importantly, granting discovery rights to an intervenor
would almost certainly lead to an attempt to introduce testimony
regarding the defendant's past antitrust violations. Such testimony
would make any judgment subsequently entered available to private
treble damage claimants as prima facie evidence of the defendant's
guilt and would destroy one of the defendant's primary incentives to
submit to consent agreements.
The ease with which these difficulties can be avoided varies. First,
intervention might be granted without allowing any participation in
bargaining discussions or by limiting such participation to permit disclosure of sensitive information only to the Antitrust Division.46 Control of discovery presents a more difficult problem. If an intervenor is
granted party status for the purpose of arguing a particular claim, and
if that charge cannot be investigated adequately without resort to
discovery procedures, it is difficult to envision how such privileges can
properly be withheld. This dilemma has undoubtedly contributed to
the reluctance of courts to confer party status on would-be intervenors.
47
In federal civil actions discovery rights are conditioned on such status.
46 Intervention for the purposes of participating in bargaining discussions has been
denied in the past. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 25; M. GOLDBERG, supranote 2, at 68-69.
47 For example, FED. R. Crv. P. 26 (governing the taking of depositions), FED. R. Civ. P.

33 (governing the serving of interrogatories), and FED. R. Crv. P. 34 (governing the discovery
and production of documents) all are available only to "any party" to the action.
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Possibly feeling that extensive procedural rights would be both inevitable and undesirable, the courts have pretermitted the issue by denying
intervention altogether.
Nevertheless, many applicants for intervention can make a colorable showing of a claim to some measure of relief. Certainly, past
victims of the defendant's alleged wrongs have a right to request
effective protection against future antitrust violations. 48 Likewise,
those disadvantaged by the deprivation of prima facie evidence of the
defendant's guilt entailed by entry of a consent decree can point to a
primary, if not paramount, purpose of Section 5(a)-a desire to facilitate the prosecution of the claims of private litigants-as a reason for
carefully reviewing the Antitrust Division's settlement decision.4 9
The practical problem thus becomes one of fashioning the means
for allowing the court to ventilate whatever objections are raised to the
decree and to grant whatever relief is required while continuing to
preserve a viable settlement option for the litigants. Two competing
alternatives for accomplishing this objective present themselves: (1) a
system of informal participation and consultation and (2) a system of
formal but stringently conditioned intervention. Both approaches have
been utilized, although the former is by far the more common. Each
merits consideration in more detail.
I.

INFORMAL RESOLUTION OF NONPARTY OBJECTIONS

One problem constantly facing the court in the consent decree context is how to develop an adequate understanding of the underlying
issues without destroying the utility of the settlement by transgressing the statutory prohibition on taking testimony. The most commonly adopted method for achieving this objective is amicus curiae
appearances,50 although on occasion less formal submissions, such as
48 The injunctive relief sought by the Government is intended to restrain the supposed
prior antitrust violations of the defendant. Consent decrees which fall short of that goal
have arguably failed in their major purpose and should not be entered by the court until
revised.
49 The argument that the overriding purpose in enacting section 5(a) was to aid private
treble damage claimants is ably made in Note, supra note 36, at 1338-39 nn.16-18.
50 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade
Cas.)
73,526 (S.D.N.Y." Mar. 22, 1971); United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970); United
States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 889 U.S. 580 (1968).
Although amid have traditionally been viewed as neutral participants in the proceedings, a marked shift to a more partisan role in recent years has been noted. See generally
Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L. 694 (1963).
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letters addressed to the court, have proved sufficient. Neither the
Antitrust Division 2 nor the defendant53 normally opposes a motion by
third parties to appear before the court in an informal, informationdispensing capacity. This level of participation serves to focus the attention of the trial judge on the critical provisions of the consent decree and does not risk impairing future settlement possibilities.
Once this knowledge is acquired, the court has considerable discretion to refashion the eventual settlement along lines it regards as
consonant with the public interest. This power stems from the court's
authority to reject those decrees which it feels inadequately protect
legitimate elements of public concern. The court's views, if forcefully
expressed, will almost inevitably be adopted in the final decree since
they will be interpreted by the litigants as foreshadowing the court's
54
position on the merits were the case to be tried.
Significantly, the court's influence does not depend on the status of
the person objecting to the proposed settlement. It should not be
surprising, therefore, to find that whether a potential intervenor is
admitted as a party is completely independent of whether it is granted
relief. 55 Courts are able to protect the concerns of both parties and
nonparties with equal vigor. The mechanics of this process are best
understood by examining the judicial response to the two broad classes of problems typically raised by applicants for intervention: (1) requests to obtain evidence of the defendant's alleged past antitrust
violations and (2) requests for protection against recurrences of the
defendant's alleged illegal activities.
51 United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970).

Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 85, at 19; Turner Letter, supra note 21, at X-2.
Defendants' Brief, supra note 35, at 6.
54 United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per
curiarm sub noma. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968), is
illustrative of this process. The decree eventually entered in that case was the third
brought forward by the parties-the first having been unilaterally withdrawn by the
Government in response to the objections of amici and the second vetoed by the court.
55 Intervention denied, relief denied: United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
Intervention denied, relief granted: United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp.
1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., No. 67 C 612 (N.D.
Ill., Nov. 27, 1967), affd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 390 U.S.
715 (1968). Intervention granted, relief denied: United States v. Simmonds Precision Prods.,
Inc., 319 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co.,
280 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Ky. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub noma. Central Bank 8- Trust Co. v.
United States, 391 U.S. 469 (1968). Intervention granted, relief granted: Cascade Natural
Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
52
53
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A. Evidence of Past Harms: Discovery Without Intervention
A large percentage of petitions to intervene result from a desire to
secure the benefit of a favorable judgment litigated by the Government.5 6 These applicants directly challenge the administrative decision
to settle the suit, arguing that the deprivation of evidence entailed by
a settlement materially impairs the prosecution of their private treble
damage actions.
This type of claim is illustrated by United States v. Automobile
Manufacturers Association,57 in which the defendant association together with the "big four" auto manufacturers were charged with conspiracy to eliminate competition in the production of motor vehicle
air pollution control equipment. It was alleged that this scheme was furthered by another conspiracy involving collusive bidding for the purchase of patents and patent rights covering such equipment. The consent
decree, filed after eight months of negotiations, was opposed by numerous state and local governmental units either as amici or as petitioners
to intervene. All but one member of the latter group were treble damage claimants in pending civil actions. The court recognized that their
main objective in seeking to intervene was the prevention of a settlement not probative of the defendants' guilt""
The court denied all motions to intervene, rejecting the applicants'
requests on multiple grounds. Initially, it noted that "the decision
to settle an antitrust case in this fashion, like the decision to commence
it in the first place, is an administrative decision and... [a]s such, it
is not subject to review by this court." 9 Continuing, the court analyzed
the terms of the decree and found that the Government had obtained
substantially all the injunctive relief which would have been warranted
by a successful trial on the merits. 60 Returning to the applicants' assertion that, notwithstanding this fact, approval of the settlement should
be withheld, the court stated:
It has been urged that the decree adversely affects the rights of
treble damage claimants in the prosecution of their own claims. But
...[w]e know of no authority... which would require the Gov56 Since Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967),
four of the seven instances of attempted intervention in the proceedings held prior to
entry of consent decrees have raised this issue. Compilation from 1967-71 Trade Gas.
57 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v.

United States, 897 U.S. 248 (1970).
58 307 F. Supp. at 619-20.
59 Id. at 620.
60 Id. at 621.
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eminent to prosecute this case to judgment solely for the purpose
aiding treble damage claimants. 61
While the court's observation is undoubtedly correct, a decision to
deny treble damage claimants relief entirely is made particularly difficult by the existence of strong competing equities demanding a high
degree of governmental attentiveness to the concerns of injured parties.
Arguably, when the inferior resources of a private litigant make successful prosecution of an otherwise valid claim virtually impossible in
the absence of presumptive evidence of guilt, a consent decree settlement is tantamount to rejection of one of the underlying rationales of
section 5(a)-the facilitation of private antitrust law enforcement. 62
The courts are aware of this difficulty, however, and the Auto Manufacturers case illustrates an alternative which partially reconciles the
Government's interest in reaching a settlement with the nonparty's interest in obtaining evidence of the defendant's guilt, yet at the same time
avoids the development of testimony and the consequent prima facie
presumption of guilt. An extensive grand jury investigation of the
defendants' alleged antitrust violations had preceded the Government's
civil suit. While the jury was dismissed before it returned any indictments, it heard numerous witnesses and assembled "a tremendous
amount of evidentiary material"63 which was dearly of value to private
claimants. Although nonparties were denied intervention in the Government's subsequent civil suit, the court ordered this material, as well
as the transcript of the grand jury proceedings, to be impounded by the
Department of Justice and directed that it be made available to treble
damage claimants upon a showing of good cause. 4 Through this arrangement the court was able to provide a considerable measure of
relief to private plaintiffs who, as a result of the consent decree, were
not given presumptive evidence of the defendants' guilt.
Similarly, in United States v. Harper & Row Publishers,Inc., 65 the
trial court was again presented with the opportunity to adopt a compromise measure. That case involved an alleged conspiracy to fix prices
on certain lines of books, particularly textbooks involved in large sale
orders to government instrumentalities. As in the Auto Manufacturers
61 Id,

62 See note 36 supra.

63 307 F. Supp. at 620.
64 Id.
Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York
65 No. 67 C 612 (N.D. Ill.,
v. United States, 390 US. 715 (1968). Since much of the material referred to here is
relatively inaccessible, citations will be more extensive than would be the case were the
references to a reported opinion.

19711

Participationin Antitrust Proceedings

litigation, a grand jury investigation had preceded the filing of the
Government's complaint. According to one potential intervenor's tart
phrasing of the issue:
[S]ubstantial quantities of documents had been produced by defendants, many of which were relevant and material to the unlawful price fixing conspiracy alleged in the pending treble damage
actions. The danger exists that such documents will be turned
back to the defendants upon entry of the consent judgements in
this case and that such documents will be destroyed, suppressed
or lost.66
The relief requested was impounding of the documents in a central
depository until appropriate orders to produce them had been entered
by the various trial courts before which treble damage actions were
pending.6 7 The defendants objected to this procedure, arguing that the
movant should be relegated to its remedies through ordinary discovery
procedures.-" The Government, on the other hand, felt that extensive
disclosure was proper. It desired to exempt only those papers which
might be classified as the work product of the Antitrust Division or
subject to the informant's privilege.69
While denying all motions to intervene, the trial court did enter
a separate order impounding all documents in the possession of the
Antitrust Division-including those belonging to nonparties-very
much as the applicants had requested.70 Thus, the court's actions assured
the continued existence of this body of material but left the complicated questions of the discoverability and admissibility of various documents for resolution by the appropriate trial forum. By adopting this
approach it also managed to avoid being forced into a resolution of
factual questions bearing on the culpability of the defendants, thereby
preserving the integrity of the eventual consent decree settlement.
68 Record at 200; Memorandum in Support of Application to Intervene on Behalf of
the School District of Philadelphia, et al. at 2 [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
67 Record at 210; Memorandum, supra note 66, at 18.
68 Record at 170-71; Defendants' Brief, supra note 5, at 29-30.
69 Record at 263-64; Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 35, at 19-20.
70 Record at 302-03. The order reads in relevant part:
The United States of America, plaintiff herein, having made an investigation which
resulted in the filing of .. . [these] civil injunction cases; and it appearing that
numerous treble damage actions based in large part on the same facts as alleged in
these civil injunctive actions have been and may be filed . . . ; that motions have
been or may be made in these treble damage actions for the production of documents
• .. presently in the possession of plaintiff; and that it is in the public interest that
these documents be identifiable and preserved and remain together for possible use
in these treble damage actions.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all documents procured by
process or otherwise by the plaintiff from any individual, partnership, firm, or corporation during its investigation .... but not internal memoranda or work product
of plaintiff have been impounded... until further order I...
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The utilization of a streamlined discovery procedure at a future
date as a substitute for formal intervention in the consent decree proceeding is typical of the flexible approach presently followed by courts
in the antitrust area. Moreover, the informal status of the entity granted
relief has not affected the courts' willingness and ability to fashion a
remedy. Indeed, only in United States v. National Bank & Trust Co.7 1

did the trial judge pause to reflect on the unusual situation presented
by an impounding order issuing at the behest of nonparties. But his
hesitation was only momentary. The Government raised no objection,
and it was "clear that the court can enter such an order without granting intervention." 72 The court cited only one authority for this pronouncement-the Auto Manufacturerslitigation.
Assumed Facts and the "No Testimony" Limitation
An interest in amassing evidence of a defendant's past violations of
the antitrust laws is only one instance of the desire by nonparties to
secure what they view as a full measure of relief. Nonparties also attempt to intervene to question the adequacy of the decree's substantive
provisions. Such challenges present the court with two interrelated
questions: (1) what limits to place on its own investigations in order to
avoid giving the consent decree evidentiary weight in a subsequent action and (2) how to prevent undue delay in or prejudice to the adjudication of the rights of the litigants.
In an attempt to resolve such controversies fairly, courts have resorted to a number of procedural devices designed to produce a thorough examination of the issues without impairing the utility of the
consent decree for the parties. These informal methods deserve a more
detailed examination of their merits.
1. Limited Inquiry into Prospective Conduct. Occasionally, challenges- directed to the substantive provisions of a decree can be settled on a policy level without introducing evidence in support of
the charges made. This situation arises when the intervenor's complaint is directed primarily at the failure of the settlement to anticipate
and interdict some allegedly wrongful future activity of the defendant. A striking example of this occurred in connection with United
States v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,73 discussed above, in which
one applicant for intervention proposed a change in the substantive
terms of the decree relating to the defendants' practice of publishing
books in two editions, denominated "library" and "trade." The library
B.

71 319 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
72 Id. at 933.

73 No. 67 C 612 (N.D. IM., Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v.
United States, 390 U.S. 715 (1968).
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editions were supposedly of a higher-quality binding and thus better
able to withstand heavy use than were the corresponding trade editions.
In the extensive hearing held prior to entry of the consent decree,
however, the applicant alleged that there was no difference in quality
between these supposedly distinct versions and that the existing price
differential was established and maintained pursuant to a price-fixing
conspiracy among the defendants."4 The sellers of the defendants'
books were accused of aiding in this conspiracy by fraudulently denying that they had the less expensive volume in stock in order to induce
purchases of the higher-priced edition.7 5 It was further alleged that
while it was economically feasible to produce both library and trade
editions, the defendants might nevertheless decide out of "malice or
spite" to discontinue the less expensive trade edition.7 6 The potential
intervenor's chief concern was that the consent decree as framed
did not specifically reach these practices. It argued that unless they
were specifically condemned, the investigatory powers given the Anti77
trust Division in the decree would not be deemed to cover them,
the court would be unable to punish them through contempt proceedings, 78 and attempts to modify the decree to obtain the supplemental
relief necessary to curb these practices would founder. 70
74 See Transcript of Proceedings, Nov. 16, 1967, at 33-38 [hereinafter cited as Nov. 16
Proceedings].
75 Id. at 16-18, 30.
76 Id. at 41-42.
77 The Division's powers to police settlements are restricted by the Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1970), to those matters deemed "relevant" to violations of
the consent decree. Id. § 1312(a). The question of relevance is often fiercely contested,
with the erstwhile defendant obviously adopting a very restrictive view and, by and
large, being sustained in its contention by the courts. Flynn, supra note 2, at 996-97. Moreover, the recent case of United States v. Armour & Co., 91 S. Ct. 580 (1971), poses additional
problems for the Division. Its decision that consent decrees should be narrowly construed
would make it difficult to sustain an argument that certain conduct not explicitly con-

demned in the decree should nevertheless be deemed unlawful by implication.
78 While the power of a court to punish consent decree violations through contempt
proceedings is unquestioned, this power has seldom been utilized. There are three interlocking reasons for this. First, the Division practically never initiates contempt proceedings.
Professor Posner reports that since the inception of the antitrust laws, the Government
has instituted criminal contempt proceedings on only twenty-two occasions and has been
successful in only twelve of these instances. Posner, supra note 1, at 387 (Table 16). Professor Goldberg, writing in 1962, could find only thirty-nine instances of contempt proceedings brought in connection with antitrust consent decrees since 1890. M. GOLDBFRG,
supra note 2, at 66. Another commentator could discover only three such efforts in the
period from 1960 to 1969. Note, supra note 36, at 1344. Thus, at most a total of forty-two
attempts to punish decree violations through contempt proceedings have been made in
approximately eighty years.
Second, nonparties to the litigation have traditionally been held to lack standing to
initiate contempt actions. See, e.g., United States v. ASCAP, 341 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965); United States v. Western Electric Co., 1968 Trade Cas.
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The defendants denied that any of these practices had ever existed
or were contemplated, but the trial judge dismissed their protestations
of innocence as irrelevant to the issue confronting him. Desiring to
avoid an inquiry into the defendants' past activities, the court nevertheless wanted to insure the prospective effectiveness of the decree.8 0
The trial judge's method of achieving this goal was quite novel.
Although no changes were made in the text of the decree, a number of
understandings were arrived at between the defendants and the court
which the latter likened to legislative history."' First, defendants' counsel stipulated that they were willing to interpret the scope of the consent decree to permit investigations by the Antitrust Division to detect
misrepresentations of the type of books in stock. It was further agreed
that if such investigations disclosed these proscribed practices, the
defendants would not oppose, on procedural grounds, a modification
of the decree to prohibit them explicitly 8 2 The court indicated its
85,279 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Clark Walter & Sons v. United States, 392
U.S. 657 (1968). While one recent commentator has criticized this doctrine, his proposal to
vest nonparties with limited enforcement powers has not yet been accepted. See generally
Comment, Antitrust Consent Decrees: A Proposal to Enlist Private Plaintiffs in Enforcement Efforts, 54 CoaNm.L L. REv. 763 (1969).
Finally, this lack of eligible and enthusiastic advocates for contempt sanctions coalesces
with the court's traditional ignorance of the factual underpinnings of the consent decree
to create an understandable reluctance on its part to exercise its contempt power. In
litigated cases or in those instances in which the court has had the benefit of an informal
discussion of the issues before entry of the decree, this factor would not be a problem.
Generally, however, neither method of fact resolution has been utilized before ratification
of the decree, and consequently the court is not able to decide whether a particular course
of conduct violates the decree. Compare United States v. Western Electric Co., 1968 Trade
Cas. 85,279 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Clark Walter & Sons v. United States,
392 U.S. 657 (1968) (apparently rejecting intervenor's literal interpretation of decree
provision, under which the defendant would be in contempt, in favor of parties' construction of document, on the theory that their knowledge of its terms exceeds that of
applicant), with United States v. R. L. Polk & Co., 1969 Trade Cas. 87,730, 87,733 (E.D.
Mich. 1969) (sustaining criminal and civil contempt charges and granting supplemental
relief), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 438 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1971).
79 Consent decrees are not easily modified, by either the Government or the defendant, although it is possible that Government attempts are governed by a more liberal
standard. See generally Dabney, Antitrust Consent Decrees: How Protective an Umbrella?,
68 YALE L.J. 1391, 1392-97 (1959); Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 H.Rv. L. REv. 1303 (1967). Compare United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119
(1932), with United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 US. 244-49 (1968).
80 Nov. 16 Proceedings, supra note 75, at 7-9.
81 Id. at 45.
82 Id. at 25-26, 55. In many respects this was the most controversial of the claims
raised by the intervenors. Apparently the parties felt that this particular practice was not
only not prohibited by the consent decree but was also not reached by the Government's
complaint. The defendants maintained that the alleged business practice, while reprehensible and indeed fraudulent, did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. Hence
they were prepared to oppose modification on substantive grounds. Id. at 26.
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willingness to do "everything that [it] could to protect . . . against
that."8 3 The judge further stated that differential prices on qualitatively identical items and economically unjustified decisions by the
defendants to cease publication of certain types of books would be
84
deemed violations of the decree and punished by contempt sanctions.
With this gloss, the decree provided substantial protection to all major
interests raised by the applicants. The "unsuccessful" intervenors were
also given an auxiliary role in policing this ban by virtue of an express
provision of the decree giving them substantial rights of access
to evidence of postdecree violations accumulated by the Division.8 5
Thus, a flexible, informal resolution of the nonparty's concerns was
achieved without delving into the defendants' past behavior. By confining the discussion to hypothetical future conditions, no factual controversy was permitted to develop. The question naturally arises
whether a similar method can be developed to deal with objections to
the decree which are more directly related to the defendant's prior
conduct.
2. Limited Inquiry into Past Conduct. An intervenor's challenge
to a consent decree is often based on a claim that the Antitrust Division is seeking less relief than is required by the public interest.
The options available to the court in such a situation depend to a large
extent on whether the Division disagrees either with the potential intervenor's assessment of the underlying facts or with its choice and
application of the relevant substantive legal standards. If the former,
Id. at 31.
84 With respect to the alleged price fixing conspiracy, the following exchange occurred:
83

MR. NEWBURG [attorney for intervenors]: What I am saying is the bookstore buys
the same book at a discount and it is called a trade edition. The very same edition is
sold to the library at net price and it is labeled library edition, so . . .while there is
no difference in cost . . .very often the very same identical physical book is sold at
different prices ....
THE COURT: All right. If you can establish that you would have no trouble
getting violation of this consent decree.
Id. at 37-38. With respect to economically irrational decisions to cease publication, the
court was equally direct:
THE COURT: [1]f I thought for a single moment that the curtailment of the
publication of . . . trade editions was motivated by any desire to arrest the public
bodies or to deprive them of getting a product that they were entitled to get by virtue
of unstifled competition, or if cessation of the publications was out of a mode of
revenge or personal satisfaction, I wouldn't hesitate a moment to do something about
it.
Id. at 62-63. The court went on to say:
With that understandingI don't think there could be any dispute by anybody about
what motivates the Court's willingness to accept . .. this consent decree.

Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
85 The decree eventually entered in Harper& Row is reported at 1967 Trade Cas. 84,552
(N.D. II. 1967). The provision allowing certain intervenors access to evidence of postdecree violations is incorporated in paragraph X of that decree. Id. at 84,555.
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the pressure to receive testimony becomes intense; but if the latter, the
difficulty may be avoided by transforming the issue into one of formulating a proper rule of law on the basis of certain assumed, but not
established, factual conditions.
The transformation of a potential factual dispute into a question of
law is illustrated by UnitedStates v. Minnesota Mining& Manufacturing
Co. 86 (3-M). The applicant for intervention in that case argued that the
defendant's alleged past patent abuses had been so flagrant that a provision of the consent decree requiring the defendant to grant licenses
on a nondiscriminatory, reasonable-royalty basis was insufficient. Dedication of the offending patents was suggested as the appropriate measure of relief.8 7 In responding to this assertion, the Antitrust Division
did not terminate consideration of this claim by opposing intervention."" Instead, it engaged in a frank discussion of the bargaining that
had gone into the fashioning of the decree. It admitted that royaltyfree licenses were often insisted on in similar cases8 9 but pointed to
what it considered to be fully adequate substitutes for that relief which
were already incorporated into the decree, such as a requirement that
3-M disclose certain important manufacturing processes. 90 After receiving briefs and hearing oral arguments on these matters, the court denied the applicant any relief.91
It is important to note that in the 3-M case the court was able to
decide the issues in conflict between the Antitrust Division and the
unsuccessful applicant without having to resolve factual questions.
Once the Division conceded that dedication or its equivalent was the
appropriate measure of relief, the court could accept the applicant's
representations about the defendant's prior conduct as true for purposes of argument. Freed from the possibility of having to hear
evidence or testimony on this issue, it could deal solely with the narrow
legal question of whether the relief provided by the consent decree
was an adequate substitute for the dedication requested by the applicant for intervention.
A far more difficult problem would have been presented if the potential intervenor and the Antitrust Division had not agreed on the nature
86 No. 66 C 627 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 2, 1969).
87 See Motion of Polychrome Corporation to Intervene at 2-12; Memorandum of Law in
Support of the Motion of Polychrome Corporation to Intervene at 1-3, 6-9.
88 The general position of the Government was set out in Transcript of Proceedings,
Sept. 2, 1969, at 17-46. While the Government did claim that intervention was inappropriate under existing case law, its discussion of this point was quite perfunctory. Id. at
41-46.
89 Id. at 34-35.
90 Id. at 17-38, especially 34-38.
91 Id. at 56.
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of the defendant's allegedly culpable conduct. Under such circumstances the court finds itself in an almost impossible dilemma. On one
hand, it does not seem that such a controversy can be resolved intelligently by the court without a rather detailed inquiry into the defendant's past activities. Yet these are the very matters whose official factual
resolution the consent decree is designed to avoid.
Although there are no cases involving intervention which clearly
illustrate this problem, similar conflicts have arisen in other consent
decree contexts. The techniques employed in those cases are suggestive
of those which could be applied in situations in which applicants for
intervention disagree with the Division's presentation of the facts.
United States v. Standard Oil Co. 92 represents perhaps the most ingenious attempt to resolve this problem. The difficulty in that case arose
between the Antitrust Division and the defendants rather than between parties and nonparties. The Government's complaint, filed in
1950, had requested that certain allegedly monopolistic practices of
the defendants be remedied by divestiture. The complicated negotiations which followed lasted eight years and finally deadlocked on this
point. It appeared that the issue would have to be set for a full trial,
and, anxious to avoid this possibility, the trial judge suggested an
alternative approach. His basic strategem was to have the parties present their views and relevant background information on the defendants' business practices as if the issue of framing appropriate relief
were before the court. The stricture against receiving testimony was
to be avoided by having the requested showing made only through
statements by counsel. The culpability of the defendants prior to the
filing of the complaint was assumed for purposes of argument. On the
basis of these "hypothetical" premises, the question to be decided was
whether changed market conditions in the eight years since that time
had made divestiture an inequitable remedy.
The court received "written statements, presentations and oral arguments" from both parties. The Government generally conceded the
accuracy of the defendants' presentation of postcomplaint data "as far
as it went" but proceeded to introduce its own evidence of current
market conditions. On the basis of this hearing, the court indicated that
the Antitrust Division had not sustained the burden of showing divestiture to be appropriate. Since it was virtually certain to lose this
point on the merits, the Division withdrew its demand in subsequent
93
conferences and a mutually agreeable settlement was consumated.
A full-scale evidentiary dispute was avoided in Standard Oil when the
92

1959 Trade Cas. 75,522 (S.D. Cal. 1959).

93 Id. at 75,526-27.
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Division, faced with the court's adverse interpretation of the facts,
conceded the validity of the defendants' claim. It seems clear, however,
that the court was made aware of material whose formal recognition
would have jeopardized the inadmissible character of the consent decree in subsequent private actions. 94 Thus, the court was able to express
its opinion with regard to the merits without engaging in formal fact
finding.
While the negotiations in Standard Oil were facilitated by the parties' informal acquiescence in the court's view of the case, a formal
agreement between them can have serious consequences. Gurwitz v.
Singer95 is enlightening in this respect. In a prior federal antitrust
action, the defendants had stipulated that they had engaged in Sherman
Act violations and permitted the court in that action to "make findings
of fact and conclusions of law on the basis of the foregoing admissions."95 These stipulations went on to provide, however, that such
admissions were made "for the purpose of [the federal].., action only"
97
and were not to be given any weight in any subsequent proceedings.
Despite this disclaimer, the court held that the earlier consent judgment
was available to private plaintiffs for evidentiary purposes. It found
a "clear distinction" between consent decrees agreed to by the parties
and judgments entered on the basis of stipulated facts and held that
only the former were exempted from having a prima facie effect in subsequent treble damage actions.9 8
Any difference between the stipulated facts in the prior proceeding
in Gurwitz and the hypothetical facts adduced in framing the decree
in Standard Oil seems due more to the artfulness of counsel than to any
defensible substantive distinction. In each instance the court was presented with the litigants' own view of the true state of affairs, and in
each case its analysis of these data led directly to the parties' eventual
94 The question of just what conditions must be satisfied before a consent decree will be
given evidentiary weight is undecided. One might expect that the statutory restriction on
the taking of testimony refers only to evidence relating to the defendant's alleged antitrust violations. Presumably, the rationale which explains the failure to give cellateral
estoppel effect to consent decrees is that such issues have never been officially resolved.
The disputed facts in Standard Oil, however, were not of this character. Rather, they dealt
with postcomplaint activities of the defendant. These were scrutinized less with the intent

of proving continuing antitrust violations than of demonstrating the failure of past
anticompetitive effects to dissipate over time. Nevertheless, one authority has suggested
that Standard Oil "violates the spirit," if not the letter, of section 5(a). Flynn, supra note
2, at 991 n.31.
9b 218 F. Stpp. 686 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
96 Id. at 686-87.
97 Id. at 687.
98 Id. at 689.
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settlement. Yet the Gurwitz case sharply emphasizes one limitation
of the Standard Oil approach to resolving factual disputes. The court's
attempt to effect an agreement between the parties must be confined
to an informal, advisory opinion which, although indicating the court's
view of the case were it to be litigated, does not result in a formal stipulation of the facts. By adopting the informal procedure employed in
Standard Oil, it would be possible both to investigate the defendant's
past conduct with a considerable degree of thoroughness and to preserve a viable settlement option for the litigants. Such a procedure
could be expected to lead to the formulation of sounder decrees initially and to the possibility of subjecting them to more intelligent
interpretation, modification, and enforcement in the future.
Standard Oil also serves to highlight another limitation of the court's
inquiry if the settlement option is to be preserved. If the data submitted by the disputants, including the potential intervenor, are conflicting and the parties cannot reconcile their differences, the court must
either elect to accept one point of view more or less on faith99 or else
conduct a full hearing designed to uncover the actual state of affairs.
Adopting the latter alternative would clearly remove any subsequent
decree from the no-evidence exemption, 100 while opting for the former
99 This alternative has apparently been adopted on several occasions. For example, in
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 73,526
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1971), the consent decree obligated the court to examine purchases of
theaters by the defendant to insure that they were not anticompetitive. A particular trans.
action was challenged by a competitor of the defendant, who alleged that the defendant
had entered into a series of secret agreements with the next largest theater chain in the
area. It was alleged that these arrangements were designed to reduce competition between
these two parties and that as a consequence of the purchase in question, the defendant would
actually have a far larger share of the market than appeared on the surface. The objecting
party sought to compel production of these alleged secret documents. The court denied
this request, stating:
The state of the record is insuffident to warrant the discovery [the objecting party]
seeks. The court, under the circumstances, accepts the sworn statement of petitioner's
General Attorney for Production Matters whose affidavit submitted upon these proceedings states unequivocally that there is no [such] agreement, written or oral, express or implied ....
Id. at 90,179. Similarly, in United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
one applicant for intervention sought to "conduct discovery proceedings to further develop
the basic facts and the impact of the proposed merger." Id. at 511. But such measures
were unwarranted, the court said, since the intervenor "proceeds mostly upon predictions,
rumor and speculation rather than upon direct and visible injury to itself... ." Id. at
513.
100 The taking of testimony prior to entering a decree will allow the decree to be
utilized by private plaintiffs for evidentiary purposes. Soblosky v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 137 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Pa. 1955); De Luxe Theatre Corp. v. Balaban & Katz
Corp., 95 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ill. 1951). This is true even if the decree recites on its face
that no testimony has been taken and that no admission of liability has been made.
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would entail different results depending on whose viewpoint the court
accepted. A decision to side with the potential intervenor might result
in the defendant withdrawing its consent to the decree. A decision
against the potential intervenor might result in the court resolving an
issue against the nonlitigant without giving him the opportunity to
establish his view of the facts.
These results are mitigated by two factors, however. First, the unsuccessful applicant can establish his claim to additional relief in a separate private action. Thus, denial of intervention and ratification
of the Division's position is not so much a defeat for the applicant on
the merits as it is a relegation to a different forum. 10 1 Second, denial
of intervention as of right is itself appealable. 102 In antitrust cases this
appeal, in order to establish the "inadequacy of representation" of the
applicant's interests below, invariably includes a detailed cataloguing
of the supposedly repugnant features of the settlement. This procedure
clearly has the effect of bringing the merits of the consent decree before the reviewing court; and while the propriety of the decree is not
technically at issue on such an appeal, it appears that in litigated cases
the appelate court's decision on such matters has influenced its decision on the appropriateness of intervention. 10 3 It is the Antitrust Division's contention, apparently accepted by one lower court, that a
similar result applies to consent decree settlements:
Webster Rosewood Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1957),
aff'd, 263 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
101 No collateral estoppel effect results from Government settlements. The ability of

private parties to maintain their separate actions is, as a matter of law, unimpaired by
such a decision. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1961);
United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518-19 (1954).
Nor would a potential treble damage claimant necessarily be more effective in obtaining
relief as a practical matter (the test for intervention under rule 24) as a party to the
Government's suit than he would in a private action. He would not be able to force the
defendant to enter into a settlement, and a full trial of his claims would result in a
greater total expenditure of judicial and governmental resources than if he had maintained a separate action.
102 This means that in effect all denials of intervention are appealable since any potential intervenor can merely append a claim for intervention "as of right" to his petition for
permissive intervention and, if unsuccessful, take a single appeal from the trial court's
ruling. This distinction in appealability under the two branches of rule 24 has been most
effectively criticized in Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies
and Arbitrators,81 HARv. L. Rxv. 721, 748-51, 760 (1968).
103 See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 US. 129 (1967), on
remand, 291 F. Supp. 3 (D. Utah 1968), vacated and remanded sub nom. Utah Public
Service Commission v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969). See also United
States v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 280 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Ky. 1967), aff'd per curiam
sub noma. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 391 U.S. 469 (1968) (allowing inter-

vention in part because of prior Supreme Court decision on merits arguably contrary to
Government's settlement position).
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If the applicants were permitted to intervene, they could of
course appeal from erroneous decisions on the law or facts. The
same effect can be achieved by an appeal from a denial of intervention. If the [subsequent] decision by the District Court [on
the merits] is erroneous, then the denial of intervention . . . as a

practical matter impaired or impeded the ability of the applicant
10 4
to protect his interest.
This position considerably oversimplifies the difficulties facing an unsuccessful applicant since it assumes that the applicant will have been
able to build an adequate record below to sustain its appeal even though
not allowed to establish its view of the facts. Nevertheless, this statement
contains an important grain of truth. By now enough antitrust intervention cases exist to support the applicant's right to a very full airing
of objections to a consent decree. 1°5 The failure of a district court to
follow the informal intervention procedure could well lead a reviewing
court to hold the trial court's refusal to be an abuse of discretion.
Therefore, it appears that informal practices now employed in the
lower federal courts afford concerned nonparties a considerable role
in the fashioning of consent decrees. They are able to direct successful
challenges to substantive shortcomings of these decrees and, in effect,
to take appeals from adverse rulings-all while remaining technically
outside of the litigation.
III.

FopmiAL INTERVENTION: How REALISTIC

AN ALTERNATIVE?

This comment has developed the thesis that ostensibly unsuccessful
applicants for intervention in federal antitrust cases are in reality given
those procedural rights necessary to air their claims effectively and
receive the measure of relief dictated by the merits of their grievances.
Whether this informal accommodation of the interests of nonparties
can be transformed into an equally effective system of formal intervention remains to be answered.
Two recent articles commenting on the strengths and weaknesses
of the present rule 24 have concluded that the rule as presently drafted
104 United States v. ASCAP, 5 TRADn REG. REt. (1971 Trade Cas.)
73,492, at 90,012
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1971) (quoting with approval from a Government memorandum sub-

mitted in opposition to motions to intervene).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Simmonds Precision Prods., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 620
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa.
1970); United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Blue
Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Thrifty
Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968); United States v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., No. 67 C 612 (N.D. 11., Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd per curiam sub noma.City of
New York v. United States, 390 U.S. 715 (1968).
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tffords- an opportunity for extensively conditioning the participatory
rights given to intervenors. 10 6 The remarks of Professor Shapiro on
this point are particularly insightful:
When one is granted intervention, either as of right or in the exercise of discretion, it does not necessarily follow that he must be
granted all the rights of a party at the trial and appellate levels,
including full rights of discovery and cross-examination, the ability
to veto a settlement of the case, and the right to appeal from a
final decision. It is both feasible and desirable to break down the
concept of intervention into a number of litigation rights and to
conclude that a given person has one or some of these rights but
07
not all.1
Professor Shapiro's suggestion, at least in the federal antitrust setting,
explicitly acknowledges the real nature of the present informal practice of handling objections to consent decrees-a flexible but stringently conditioned form of intervention. The procedural rights now
granted to nonparties under this informal system could not be expected to change significantly were they given formal party status since
the basic pressures which have fashioned the limitations on these rights
would be unaltered. Nevertheless, formal recognition of the system now
in effect would to some extent serve to regularize the pragmatic approach adopted by the lower federal courts in handling questions of
intervention.
A step in this direction was taken recently in United States v. Simmonds Precision Products, Inc.,08 in which the Government's suit
challenged the acquisition of Liquidometer Corporation by Simmonds.
At the time of the merger these two corporations and one other controlled the entire market for aircraft fuel gauging systems. Although
the complaint had requested that the acquired company be divested
intact as a viable enterprise, the proposed consent decree permitted
a piecemeal disposal of Liquidometer. The employee's union of the
acquired company sought to challenge this provision since it posed
a serious threat to the job security and employment rights which had
accrued to union members under their contracts with Liquidometer.
It insisted that the original request for divestiture of the company as
a whole should be followed.10 9
106 See generally Shapiro, supra note 102, espedally pages 752-59. See also Kennedy,
Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 Kr. LJ. 829, 866-67, 874-80

(1969).
107

Shapiro, supra note 102, at 727.

108 319 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

109 Id. at 620-21.
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The court granted the union's motion to intervene under rule
24(a)(2) "for the purpose of opposing the entry of a final judgment on
consent," and "an evidentiary hearing was held on the merits of the
"10 The hearing revealed that after the origiUnion's opposition . .. ".
nal complaint had been filed, two groups of key management personnel
had left Liquidometer to form two new competitive firms. Their
success had been immediate and dramatic, so that the market now
contained three thriving firms exclusive of Liquidometer and Simmonds. The court also found that, in striking contrast, Liquidometer
had suffered heavy losses and that it threatened not only to go bankrupt, but to cause Simmonds to fail also."'
The court reasoned that the Government's primary concern in bringing the suit had been the preservation of a competitive market and
that changing conditions had shifted the means of attaining that goal
from wholesale divestiture to piecemeal disposal of the acquired firm's
assets. It decided that the union's goal of keeping Liquidometer functioning as a unit did not override the legitimate interest of the public
in promoting the maximum feasible number of healthy, competitive
firms in the market. Judgment against the union was rendered accord112
ingly.
The court's decision to grant the union's request for intervention is
understandable. The impending divestiture posed a real and immediate threat to its financial well-being and no alternative forum for protecting this interest was available. 113 In allowing intervention, however, the court had to face the question of what procedural rights
should be granted the union after its admission. While the Simmonds
court did not explicitly formulate the limits it placed on the union's
participation, a practical solution may be suggested. The Advisory
Committee's notes to the 1966 amendment of rule 24 clearly show an
110 Id.
'11 Id. at 621-22.

Id. at 622-23.
113 Cf. United States v. Ling-Temnco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970),
discussed in text at notes 26-33 supra. It is somewhat surprising that the court allowed the
union to intervene as of right under rule 24(a)(2) rather than permissively under rule
24(b)(2), but there is a plausible justification for this result. Professor Shapiro recognizes
a broad class of potential intervenors whose interest in the proceedings sets them apart
from general members of the public but who may not have an independent legal claim
against any of the parties to the litigation. Shapiro, supra note 102, at 736-38. Rule 24(b)
(2) requires that an applicant present a "claim or defense" having a question of law or
fact in common with the main action, while rule 24(a)(2) imposes no such restriction on
the intervenor's interest. In Simmonds it is not dear that the union had a legally cognizable
claim or defense against anyone, so that admitting the union "as of right" may have been
the only alternative to not admitting it at all.
112
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intent to allow restrictions to be placed on intervention under rule
24(a): "An intervention of right . . . may be subject to appropriate
conditions or restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings."1 1 4 Thus, the scope
of the procedural rights afforded to a private intervenor in federal
antitrust proceedings should be controlled by the particular problems
surrounding the effective presentation and resolution of its claim. 115
Just how such rights might be conditioned is best examined in the
context of a specific situation. In Simmonds, for example, had the
114 39 F.R.D. 69, 111 (1966).

115 Four major areas have been identified in which intervention as of right has traditionally differed from permissive intervention: (1) the right to an immediate appeal
from a denial of intervention, (2) the standard of appellate review governing the denial
of intervention, (3) the need for an independent jurisdictional base for the intervenor's
claim, and (4) the procedural rights conferred by the grant of intervention. Kennedy,
supra note 106, at 334-35. Professor Kennedy suggests generally that the rationales for
these distinctions have weakened over time and that they presently serve no useful purpose.
Id. at 354-72.
The one possible exception to this development is the right to assert compulsory
counterclaims or crossclaims. Professor Kennedy feels that compulsory counterclaims or
crossclaims cannot be restricted where intervention is as of right but can where intervention is only permissive. Id. at 358. Since it appears that both branches of rule 24 may have
to be utilized in order to admit deserving parties to antitrust proceedings, see note 113
supra, this distinction is of considerable importance. For example, one would certainly
not want to allow private parties a right to assert their antitrust claims against the defendant if admitted to the Government's suit under rule 24(a)(2).
In addition to denying intervention altogether, two methods of avoiding this consequence
without disturbing existing case law appear possible. First, through a broad interpretation of the "common question" provision of rule 24(b)(2), the court could always grant
intervention at its discretion. This approach is an especially promising way to treat
potential treble damage plaintiffs since it is not unreasonable to treat their claims as
presenting "questions of law or fact in common" with the main action for purposes of
admission to the proceedings under rule 24(b). Alternatively, where intervention is appropriate only under rule 24(a), the court could regard such crossclaims as "permissive" under
rule 13(b) rather than "compulsory" under rule 13(a). Either approach would obviate
the necessity of resolving private disputes ancillary to the Government's action.
A more direct approach would be to refuse to perpetuate this distinction in the consent decree context. The blurring of rules 24(a) and 24(b) in that setting is already approaching the point at which the two branches are indistinguishable. As one court noted:
Having concluded that neither movant makes out a case for intervention as a matter
of right ....
the court reaches quickly a similar decision on the alternative of permissive intervention ....
The critical judgment now made is that the consent decree
is a proper disposition. The prolongation of the suit has not been shown .. . to be
desirable or justifiable. Absent such a showing, in an antitrust case brought by the
United States, continuation of the litigation becomes by definition a course that
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis added). The
clear import of the court's language is that formal intervention under either branch of
rule 24 is equally inappropriate if the objections to the decree are found to be insubstantial.
Conversely, where the nature of the applicant's claim is held to warrant allowing him
to intervene, the branch of the rule employed should be equally irrelevant.

1971]

Participationin Antitrust Proceedings

union been able to attribute Liquidometer's poor earning record to
Simmonds' mismanagement of the firm, the court might well have accepted the union's contention that a divestiture of the acquired company as a functioning entity rather than piecemeal would better serve
the public interest.11 To sustain such a charge, the union would have
required access to records of the management and bookkeeping practices of the controlling corporation during the relevant period. Under
such circumstances the court would probably have been faced with
a challenge to the union's right to discovery of the critical documents.
A restriction of the right to utilize discovery procedures beyond those
required by the rules of evidence does not seem to be warranted where
access to the desired information is indispensable to establishing the
applicant's case. If the intervenor can establish a prima facie case for
relief, it is difficult to justify denying it access to the records necessary
to substantiate its claim . 17 The opportunity for a full discussion of
the disputed matter has been the most beneficial aspect of the informal
participation system 18 and should not be abandoned when that system
is replaced by formal intervention.
Nevertheless, the pressures to avoid compromising the settlement
option by allowing the indiscriminate introduction of testimony are
strong. Perhaps the best possible accommodation of these conflicting
interests would be to allow either the Antitrust Division or the defendant to withdraw its consent as an alternative to letting the discovery
procedure go forward. Such an option would provide the parties with
another opportunity to frame a settlement agreeable to all concerned
and which would not constitute prima facie evidence of guilt. Further,
it would allow a greater influence by nonparties in the formulation
of consent decrees while preserving the basic features of the settlement
process."19
118 The union did allege that the acquired company's losses were mere paper alloca-

tions by Simmonds of its own debts. Although this matter was settled against the union
without explicit reference to actuarial records, other matters were alluded to which fully
justified the court's rejection of this contention. United States v. Simmonds Precision
Prods., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 620, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
117 The proper rule appears to be that framed by Professor Shapiro: "Some limitations

would seem appropriate even when intervention is of right, so long as the limits imposed do
not preclude effective presentation of the intervener's interest." Shapiro, supra note 102,
at 756 (emphasis added).
118 See United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., No. 66 C 627 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 2,
1969), discussed in text at notes 86-91 supra; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1959
Trade Cas. 75,522 (S.D. Cal. 1959), discussed in text at notes 92-94 supra.
119 At least one other alternative is open to the court, in certain circumstances. If the
issue raised by the applicant for intervention were relatively peripheral, the court might
agree to enter all of the decree except the disputed portion. Such a procedure would have
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Similarly, adoption of a formal intervention system establishes the
existence of the right to appeal. It has been suggested that while waiver
of the right to appeal could not be required as a condition to allowing
intervention, standing to take an appeal is not automatically conferred
by entry into the litigation. 120 It seems reasonable to suppose, however,
that an appeal should be permitted once a party is admitted to the proceedings, provided the challenge is on an aspect of the decree which
affects it.
This was the policy followed in Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v.
Wheatley,121 in which Norman's brought a suit against the Board of
Alcoholic Beverages challenging the validity of the Virgin Islands
Alcoholic Beverages Fair Trade Law.12 2 Four importers and wholesalers of domestic liquors sought and were granted leave to intervene
as additional parties defendant. 12 The court found the law void because of its conflict with section 3 of the Sherman Act 1 24 and entered

125
a permanent injunction against its enforcement.
The Board chose not to appeal, but the four intervenors did contest the ruling. Norman's questioned their standing to bring an appeal
since no declaratory or injunctive relief had been either sought or obtained against them.1 26 The court of appeals brushed aside this objection, holding that" '[t]he intervenor... has the right to appeal from
all interlocutory and final orders which affect him.' . . . Put another
way, '[o]ne who has become a party by intervention ... is entitled, if
aggrieved,to appeal.' 127

several advantages. First, it would insure some relief immediately from the major features
of the defendant's allegedly wrongful activities. Second, it would guarantee that the
bulk of the decree would come within the section 5(a) no-evidence exception, irrespective
of the depth of the investigation undertaken with regard to the disputed issue. Finally,
it would serve to soften the litigants' resistance to outside inquiry both by restricting its
compass and by minimizing its adverse effects.
120 Shapiro, supra note 102, at 753-54.
121 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.)
73,606 (3d Cir. June 17, 1971).
122 V.1. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 150-160 (Supp. 1971). The provisions of the Act were
manifestly anticompetitive though arguably legal. For example, section 156 required the
brand owner or his licensee to file a list of the minimum retail prices at which his
liquors could be sold in the Virgin Islands and banned all sales below those figures. Sections 153 through 155 permitted a wholesaler of alcoholic beverages to enter into contracts with retailers establishing a minimum resale price for branded liquor. This price
was binding even on retailers who did not sign such contracts.
123 Since the court of appeals did not indicate whether these interventions were granted
under rule 24(a) or rule 24(b), nothing in its opinion turned on such a distinction.
124 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
125 The trial court opinion is reported at 5 TRADE R G. R,.
(1971 Trade Cas.)
73,423
(D.V.I. Aug. 14, 1970).
126 5 TRAaE REG. REt. (1971 Trade Cas.)
73,606, at 90,492; cf. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
FR2d 1715 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
127 5 TRAE REG. Ra'. (1971 Trade Cas.)
73,606, at 90,492, quoting with approval 3B
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This holding is clearly applicable in the consent decree context. It
is difficult to imagine a closer analogy to the typical consent decree than
an injunctive order from which neither of the original parties seeks to
appeal. The sensible approach followed by the court in Norman's
should govern review of consent decree interventions as well. Standing
to appeal should be held to exist whenever the issues triggering the
intervenor's participation have been decided against it.128
Norman's and Simmonds could well serve as prototypes for a formal
system of intervention fully capable of resolving the concerns of nonparties in a fair and expeditious fashion. Together, they suggest that
the intervenor should have the procedural rights necessary to present
its claim and to acquire standing to take an appeal. 29 In each instance the intervenor's presence created no untoward consequences for
the litigants and led to a much fuller discussion of the critical features
of the eventual decree than would have otherwise taken place. The
widespread utilization of a system of conditioned formal intervention
would take advantage of the possibilities for the flexible resolution of
conflicts inherent in rule 24.
CONCLUSION

Lower federal courts are now experimenting with limited informal intervention in the resolution of disputes concerning federal
antitrust consent decrees. The concerns of nonlitigants are fully heard
and accommodated according to their merits without formally admitting them to the proceedings. The denial of formal recognition probably stems from the courts' hesitancy to confer on such applicants all
of the rights conventionally thought of as accruing to a party.
The courts' concern that the limited rights now granted informally
J. MooRE, F DmuL PRACtnCE § 24.15 (2d ed. 1969) and 9 J. MooRE & B. WARD, FEDMa.
PRACTICE § 203.06 (2d ed. 1969).
128 This does not mean that such an intervenor should have the power to block entry
of any settlement agreeable to the Antitrust Division, the defendants, and the court entering the decree. On the contrary, such a right should be withheld, as it apparently was
in Simmonds, in order to avoid undue delay or prejudice to the original litigants. The
ability to seek appellate review of the judgment below should serve as a sufficient protection for the intervenor's interests. See text at notes 38-40 supra. See also Shapiro, supra
note 102, at 756-57 n.157.
129 Another group of advantages possibly accruing to an intervenor are the right to
seek a judicial construction, modification, or enforcement of the settlement. The typical
consent decree contains a provision by which the court retains jurisdiction for these purposes, but only at the request of "any of the parties" to the judgment. Flynn, supra
note 2, at 997 & n.48. Such privileges do not seem inevitable, however. Were they viewed as
undesirable, the wording of this provision could be altered to name specifically those
parties entitled to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Such rights do not attach to intervendon per se.
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could not be similarly conditioned in a formal system is unfounded.
On the contrary, their power to do so is virtually beyond question.8 0
Should the district courts choose to abandon their informal methods of
accommodating the interests of nonparties, the general contours of the
resulting formal intervention seem clear. Leave to intervene would
be granted at the discretion of the court and would be limited to as
narrow a substantive compass as possible. Procedural rights would be
afforded as required for a full examination of the underlying controversy, including if necessary the right to discovery and compulsory
process, subject in turn to the litigants' alternative right to withdraw
their consent from the settlement. The power to block entry of a consent decree or other settlement agreeable to the original parties and
the court would be withheld, but the right to appeal from such a
judgment would be retained. Formal intervention of this kind would
provide a workable framework for harmonizing the conflicting rationales of the antitrust laws-the promotion of effective private enforcement and the utilization by the Government of the most efficient
means of settlement.
Robert P. Schuwerk
130 Kennedy, supra note 107, at 366-67; Shapiro, supra note 102, at 727, 752-56.

